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The 1987 Result 
Although the 1987 election result in Scotland did not immediately 
cause a revolution of any kind, there are certainly grounds for regarding it 
as a political milestone in the process - a process which has been gaining 
speed over the past 25-30 years - whereby Scotland re-establishes a 
separate identity, politically and in other fields, and effectively de-colonises 
itself from the British ascendancy. On June 11th 1987, "the winds of 
change" (H MacMillan) turned into "a rouch wind blawin" (H Henderson). 
The election results are analysed in detail elsewhere in this journal, but 
some figures have to be cited at the onset here by way of introduction. 
Labour's 50 MPs was the highest number for any party (ie, excluding 
Coalitions) since the Liberals' 58 in 1910. The Tories' 10 seats represented 
their worst result since 1910, and is the smallest number of MPs which a 
government party has ever had in Scotland. (The only remotely similar 
situation was their 13 seats in the Conservative Government of 1922-23.) 
And it is in this respect that the National Question has moved centre-stage, 
since the Tories now have the task of running the political system in 
Scotland with a team which is so short on numbers (not to mention talent). 
And it is certainly the Tories weakness and the challenging of their 
'mandate to govern Scotland' that is creating the potential for change, 
rather than the increased strength of Labour (important though that is). 
The fact that the Tories now have such a problem stems from the 
concessions which have been made to national sentiment and political 
pressure over the past hundred years, from the appointment of the first 
Scottish Secretary in 1885, through the setting up of the Scottish Office in 
the 1930s (and the subsequent expansion of its functions), to the advent of 
the Scottish Select Committee at the start of this decade (as part of the 
setting up of the many UK Select Committees), and the growing 
prominence (although not power) of the Scottish Grand Committee. It is 
these past developments which now make the Tories' position so 
embarrassing, and which make Scotland so different from those areas in the 
North of England where the Tories did poorly against Labour. 
Yet historically, the Tories regularly did much worse in Scotland than 
in England from 1900 until the Second World War. It was only in the period 
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1945-55 that they were able to do as well (or even a little better) here than in 
the south. Ever since 1959 they have polled worse in Scotland than their 
counterparts in England, and the Labour Party have been the majority 
party in Scotland now for almost 30 years. In the 13 post-war elections, the 
Scottish Labour lead (in seats) over the Tories has been: 10, 6, 0, -2, 7, 19, 
26, 21, 19, 25, 22, 20, 40. That sequence shows how strong the trend has 
been and how marked the latest result is. 
The significance of the 1987 result is strengthened by the degree of 
tactical voting which apparently took place. In the marginal seats held by 
the Tories, votes seemed to swing to the immediate challenger, regardless 
of party, in order to displace the incumbent MP. Hence, Labour were able 
to win seats in middle-class areas, whilst the Liberals - despite suffering 
quite a downturn in their support- were able to win seats like North-East 
Fife and Argyll. In the seats which the SNP gained, there was hardly any 
increase in the Labour vote ... in marked contrast to elsewhere. (A further 
point of interest was the marked rise in turnout in most seats, indicating 
perhaps a renewed sense of purpose on the part ofthe electorate: only 14 of 
the 72 seats showed a lower turnout that in 1983- of which 10 were the Tory 
wins and the other 4 Alliance wins.) During the campaign there was some 
encouragement given to the electorate to vote tactically against the Tories. 
An organisation called TV'87 (Tactical Voting 87) tried to attract 
prominent supporters and gain publicity, whilst the Glasgow Herald called 
on its readers to "make a statement about the way that Scotland is 
governed". 
The extent to which people increasingly voted anti-Tory (a) because 
they wanted some form of Scottish self-government, as against (b) because 
they didn't like Tory policies, is not easy to ascertain, but the two may be 
becoming so closely fused (as argued later) that it may represent less and 
less of a distinction as time goes on. If there is truth in (a), then the 
electorate have shown a considerable degree of sophistication over the past 
15 years in their ways of supporting self-government. .. by voting SNP in the 
early/mid-70s, then by voting 'yes' in the 1979 referendum, and now by 
voting tactically anti-Tory. 
Are The Trends Irreversible? 
The ways in which the parties in Scotland will approach the somewhat 
bizarre situation they now face has (at time of writing) only partly been 
revealed, but their approaches will be conditioned by the extent to which 
the political trends- at Scottish and UK level- appear to be inevitable and 
irreversible. The recent voting figures don't look good for the Tories in this 
respect: in 1979, they reassured themselves when they won back the seats 
lost to the SNP in '74; but in 1987, in the face of Rifkind forecasts of re-
taking the seats narrowly lost to the Alliance in '83, those Alliance MPs 
were all returned with greatly increased majorities (and despite the 
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Alliance's Scottish vote falling from 25% to 19% ). So it seems to be getting 
harder and harder for the Tories to take back lost ground. 
A further factor which makes the Tory position more difficult to 
reverse is that they are now 'below the PR line'- ie, they get far fewer seats 
than their vote would allow them under a PR voting system. (They can 
hardly complain, of course, since party policy is opposed to PR.) But whilst 
they have been winning slightly fewer seats than their deserts over the past 
30 years, the latest result gave them only 10 when their share of the vote 
(24%) should have entitled them to 17. In turn, this 'disadvantage' leaves 
them so short of talent to run the Scottish political system that the 
performance of those selected for office is quite likely to further discredit 
the party and damage its future electoral chances. (On the plus side, the 
behaviour of Lord James Douglas-Hamilton keeps the political satirists of 
the land well stocked with stories.) 
But in seeking to discover whether current trends are likely to 
continue, it is necessary to look beyond the immediate election figures, for, 
given the socio-economic make-up of the Scottish population and given 
statistics like average income per head, our voting patterns should be more 
in line with the English Midlands. This large, and growing, discrepancy 
requires a wider treatment, involving sociological and cultural factors. 
Some of the structural reasons for the Tories' decline in Scotland over 
the past 30 years were outlined in an article by Stephen Maxwell in Radical 
Scotland No.15 (June/July 1985). He suggested that Scottish Toryism no 
longer seemed to make any contribution at intellectual level (apart from the 
freelance ideologues of the Smith and Hume Institutes in London) as 
compared with the 19th and early 20th centuries. Further, the great 
industrial Tory families of the inter-war period had disappeared and not 
been replaced, due to the many take-overs from the south and the 
subsequent branch-economy nature of industry in Scotland. In terms of 
image, the appointment of landed gentry and such-like Public school 
figures as Secretaries of State (eg, Noble, Campbell, Younger) gave the 
party a "grouse-moor" feel to it. In more direct voting terms, the 
consistently higher Scottish rate of unemployment (since the '60s) has 
tended to turn people away from the Conservatives, whilst even the old 
working-class Orange vote which the Tories used to get has apparently 
largely deserted them. 
The only one of these factors which seems capable of being reversed is 
the "grouse-moor" image, but recruitment by the Party is so low that any 
'new image' is likely to be of the young radical right- something liable to 
cause even greater disenchantment amongst the Scottish electorate. 
Indeed, it has been the 1970s rise of the New Right in the south which has 
perhaps caused the greatest reaction by the Scottish electorate against the 
Tory Party. The new zeal for economic liberalism has been perceived as bad 
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news for Scotland, with an increase in damaging take-overs in the private 
sector and a decline in support (ideological and financial) for Regional Aid 
in the public sector. Currently, the driving ahead of the Chunnel project 
may symbolise for many Scots the new centralist and 'south-east corner' 
mentality of the Tory Government. 
And there are other aspects of the New Right's thinking which strike 
faulty chords in Scotland. As sociologist Isobel Lindsay states in Radical 
ScotlandNo.29 (Oct/Nov 1987), "the current harsh social Darwinism is not 
an ideology which fits well with the experiences of 20th century Scots. We 
have been too conscious of the fact that many of the problems and ills that 
have beset us and our parents were not of our own making. Even in the last 
ten years, the best things to have happened in Scotland - environmental, 
cultural, recreational- have been primarily primed by public money; the 
worst things that have happened- high unemployment and cuts in services 
- have been caused by lack of public funding or by the ruthlessness of 
private institutions." 
Further problems have arisen for the Tories on the policy side. The 
closure of Gartcosh (which caused a revolt within their own ranks) was seen 
by many as symbolic of a lack of concern for and interest in industry 
generally and Scottish heavy industry in particular. The ham-fisted 
handling of the cold climate allowance issue during the winter of '86/87 was 
the kind of thing that remains in people's minds for a long time, adding 
'geographism' to the list of 'isms' associated with the Tory party. The use of 
Scotland as a testing-ground for legislative experimentation (extended 
police powers, poll tax) represents a quite remarkable insensitivity to 
Scottish feelings. Again, there is no sign that any of this will change. 
And then we come to the question of self-government, which is 
increasingly damaging for the Tories. It's not just that the Tory party is 
setting its face ever more firmly against self-government at a time when 
political and economic developments have tended to increase the demand 
and the enthusiasm for it; it's the way that the Tories have gone about it. 
When Lord Douglas-Home was trotted out to tell everyone in 1979to "vote 
NO and we'll provide a better form of devolution", it was only a short-term 
strategy; the ploy is now seen so clearly to have been downright dishonest 
that the Tories are now perceived as the Party which is 'economical with the 
truth' even on the matters of greatest importance. It is unlikely that people 
will forget that manoeuvre. 
On the positive side, the last 20 years- and the post-79 period in 
particular- have seen many aspects of a national revival, especially on the 
cultural side. Given the increasingly mono-cultural nature of English 
society, all such developments represent a potential strengthening of the 
desire for self-government and the determination to pursue it. Advances 
have taken place in publishing in particular, with an apparently ever-
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increasing stream~ of books on all things Scottish, especially history. 
Meanwhile, attempts to introduce more Scottish material into the schools' 
curriculum seem to be making headway. The opening of the Burrell and the 
Scottish National Gallery of Modern Art have boosted national prestige, as 
have the host of small specialist and local museums. The rise and rise of 
Scottish pop groups now complements the high standard of the many 
successful professional folk~groups. On the sports field national teams and 
individuals usually acquit themselves with dignity, if not always with 
success, but it is the former which is the more valid litmus~ test of a reviving 
self-confidence. On the spectating side, the contrasting behaviour of 
Scottish and English travelling football supporters perhaps has as much to 
tell us about the relative healths of the two societies as any other measure. 
This, and the fact that Scottish football clubs now buy English players, 
should not be underestimated as an influence on the state of the national 
self-confidence. 
On the international front, a further division between Scotland and 
Thatcher's England was seen at the time of the Commonwealth Games in 
1986, when a number of persons prominent in Scottish society were 
prepared to align themselves with a call for sanctions against South Africa, 
thereby creating an alternative Scottish viewpoint on an international issue 
of the day. At a lower level, our efforts to assist the third world are 
increasingly being made on a direct basis (eg, through organisations like 
SCIAF and Scottish Aid for Nicaragua) rather than just through southern 
'national' headquarters. 
The intensity of these increasing differences between the two societies 
has of course been heightened by the apparent permanence of the Tory 
government and of Mrs Thatcher as Prime Minister. One of the 
consequences of this has been the way in which Mrs Thatcher has come to 
represent English nationalism. As Isobel Lindsay puts it: ''The enthusiasm 
which many working-class as well as middle-class English feel for Margaret 
Thatcher is related to their perception of their national identity; she 
represents an assertive, maudlinly sentimental English nationalism -
fulfilling a yearning for renewed imperial glory. The role of the British 
bomb has had much more to do with the desire for prestige and status than 
to do with defence needs. This dominant strand of English nationalism 
strikes few chords in Scottish hearts. Scottish national sentiment has 
developed in different directions. We are David rather than Goliath; we are 
the underdogs, with considerable sympathy for other underdogs; we are 
less xenophobic (if for no other reason than that so many of our friends and 
relatives live abroad); we have no delusions of potential 'great power' 
status. Therefore, Thatcher's strand of English nationalism which has been 
accepted so warmly in the South, has produced attitudes ranging from the 
ambivalent to the antagonistic here." 
These powerful underlying trends within Britain are very important 
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for any attempt to determine where we are now and what is likely to happen 
in the next few years. They are more important than a simple study of the 
policies of the different parties or the precise results of particular elections. 
And the significance of them is that they all seem to point in the direction of 
a further decline in support for the Tory party in Scotland (or, at the very 
least, no real recovery.) If the Tories continue to be the government of the 
United Kingdom - which seems pretty likely for the foreseeable future -
then their weakness in Scotland does create a political instability, if not a 
crisis. 
The Parties' Initial Responses 
The possibility of any change in the attitude of the Tory party seems 
small. At UK level they can apparently do no wrong, and the policies of the 
radical right continue to be fed into the party machine and continue to be 
acted upon. In Scotland, although there has been a fair amount of internal 
discontent -much of it showing an understanding of the points which have 
been made above - and although the question of devolution was raised in 
several quarters post-election, the official line is against any policy change, 
and the line against self-government in particular has hardened, with Lord 
Goold leading the way, Allan Stewart finding an apparent new lease of life 
in this crusade, and with various ex-MPs almost having to join the NUJ, so 
frequent are their appearances in the columns of the Scottish quality press 
'explaining' the election result and pointing the way ahead. (Michael 
Ancram actually appeared with major articles in both the Glasgow Herald 
and The Scotsman on the same day on one occasion!) The Party at grass 
roots level seems to have too little clout to ca'llse any serious challenge at 
this stage, and given that they were unable to find 72 Scottish candidates to 
fight the election in June (having to import various 'radical righters' and 
'Sloane Rangers' from London for some of the Glasgow constituencies, 
who became known as 'The White Knights'), their relative weakness within 
the Party machine is fairly understandable. Meantime, further moves by 
the establishment included a flying visit to Glasgow by the Adam Smith 
Institute's representatives, ringing calls for "more Thatcherism" from the 
White Knights, and a conference publication from Eastwood constituency. 
It is doubtful, however, whether these manoeuvres did more than highlight 
the Tories' Scottish weakness. 
The position of Malcolm Rifkind is particularly interesting, since it is 
clear that (a) he remains committed in principle to some form of self-
government for Scotland, and (b) he is unlikely to believe that more 
Thatcherism will reverse his Party's decline in Scotland. Indeed, in an 
interview with the Press and Journal (September), he described the 
introduction of further right-wing policies in Scotland as "a high-risk 
strategy", thereby apparently distancing himself from any future falling 
masonry (and/or falling support). His close acquaintance Brian Meek, Tory 
leader on Lothian Regional Council, stated in an interview (September) 
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that he believed that "devolution was inevitable and that our Party should 
be the one to do it". Meek also viewed the hard line with some scepticism, 
and reckoned that the May 1988 District Elections would be a crucial test 
for the Party's recovery or otherwise, and that if it were otherwise then the 
devolutionists might become more prominent again. 
For the Labour Party in Scotland, the result induced a kind of political 
schizophrenia, with their best-ever Scottish result coinciding with a further 
desperate defeat in the south. The immediate response of the frustrated 
'Gang of 50' in the House of Commons is described elsewhere in this 
volume, and there is no doubt that the result caused a difference of view 
within the Party as to what should or could be done about challenging the 
Tories' mandate in Scotland. The Party establishment - epitomised by 
Donald Dewar- wanted to do nothing out of the ordinary, whilst a number 
of the MPs and an indeterminate section of the Party membership were 
looking for serious political action. Three major intellectual challenges 
faced the Party: first, confronting the very real possibility that Labour 
would not win the next General Election; any who took this view would 
clearly distance themselves from Donald Dewar's "long haul" approach 
(ie, a 5-year approach.) Second, was the possibility that if a Scottish 
Assembly were to be won from an unenthusiastic Tory Government, then 
there might be a price to be paid in terms of (a) a reduction in the number of 
Scottish MPs at Westminster, and (b) the possible withdrawal of Scottish 
MPs during debates on 'devolved business' for England & Wales; such 
concessions would clearly make the job of the UK Labour Party in winning 
and exercising power that bit more difficult. And thirdly, there was the 
prospect that any serious action on the National Question might well have 
to involve co- operation with other pro-Assembly forces, including political 
parties. (Initial forays into cross-party activity by Labour in the shape of a 
Festival For Scottish Democracy (in September) were tentative, with the 
SNP and the Alliance deciding not to participate due to being only half-
heartedly or com promisingly invited.) All three of these points would 
represent major departures from traditional Labour thinking. At the same 
time, Labour had by now won just about everything there was to win in 
Scotland apart from the Scottish Cup; from such a position it was clearly 
difficult to go up, and fairly easy to go down. 
The prominence of the National Question in all such deliberations 
within the People's Party was further heightened by the problems of 
opposing the unpopular poll tax, due to be introduced in Scotland first 
(starting in April 1989, with the Registration process beginning in April 
1988). For some Party members, the STOPIT campaign should be founded 
on the 'No Tory Mandate in Scotland' issue, whilst for others the campaign 
was attractive as an alternative to or even a diversion from the 
constitutional issue. 
The only fixed item on the agenda (as far as the National Question was 
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concerned) was the presentation of an Assembly Bill to Parliament on 30th 
November. There were several problems connected with that move (such 
as tactics, publicity, and campaigning), but since the Bill was going to be 
defeated by the massed ranks of the Tory faithful, the real question was 
what - if anything - was going to be planned as a response to that Tory 
rejection. There would be two distinct options at that stage: (1) to attempt 
(with other forces) to set up some kind of forum of MPs, Councillors, and 
other elected and non-elected representatives of Scottish life, thereby 
challenging the British right to rule in Scotland, and discussing important 
Scottish matters and the form of any future Scottish government, or (2) 
minor forms of protest could be undertaken which would represent no such 
challenge, and which would therefore be a recognition that nothing could 
be done to advance the Assembly cause this side of the next election (and a 
Labour victory in that election). It is certainly possible that a pressure 
group of some kind will appear in the Labour Party to further the cause of 
option 1, an option which is being pursued by the cross-Party Campaign for 
a Scottish Assembly, using a Steering Committee as a springboard. 
Whatever the outcome, it is the most traumatic situation the Party in 
Scotland has ever found itself in, and therefore any simple resolution of the 
problems (and the divisions) is unlikely. As Tom Nairn (the author of The 
Break-up of Britain) put it in a short analysis in the July issue of Marxism 
Today: "Caledonian Labourism has always been ultra-conscientious in its 
obeisance to all the icons ofWindsordom. The irony is that Scotland's quest 
for a more modern and distinct identity has ended in the clammy embrace 
of the party historically most hypnotised by Britishness. The question is· 
whether the Scottish Labour Party can eventually change its own nature 
and become both national enough and, more importantly, democratic 
enough to assume the responsibility which history seems to have thrust 
upon them." 
The SNP, did not enjoy the best of results in the election (2 losses, 3 
gains), and the loss of chairman Gordon Wilson's seat was a great 
disappointment to the Party. (His resolve to stay on as chairman due to the 
persuasions of Mrs Winnie Ewing looked a dubious life-support system for 
him in a Party which has been cultivating a modern and left-of-centre image 
for several years now.) However, the Party- whilst less successful than it 
would like - has been doing nothing wrong for almost 5 years, an 
achievement not to be underestimated in a Party where commitment is so 
strong and disappointments have been so many. Given its improved 
presentation in the media and given the growing trends towards national 
self-confidence, the Party must be dismayed that considerably increased 
support has not been forthcoming. Yet they are well positioned: with the 
Tories in disarray, Labour seeming to be at a peak and faced with a major 
political conundrum, and with the Alliance falling away due to merger 
wrangles, it seems that the SNP must go up soon. Hopes for the District 
Elections in May 1988 are high, and if Labour's opposition to the 'Tory 
mandate' falls flat, then major gains for the SNP seem likely. Local by-
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election results already point in that direction. 
The Alliance also came out of the election with mixed feelings: a good 
showing in Scotland with 1 loss and 2 gains, giving 9 seats, but failing to 
'break the mould' in the UK. It seems unlikely that the Alliance parties will 
(separately or together) set the heather on fire in Scotland over the next few 
years. The merger negotiations will likely take up an inordinate amount of 
activists' time and energy; the Liberals- a small party on the ground-sends 
too much of its available talent to Westminster (starting with the leader); 
the Young Libs seem to be an ex-force; and the SDP is a very small party in 
Scotland. The prospects for the Alliance in Scotland would seem to rest 
almost entirely on their TV image and the success (or otherwise) of the 
merger process. 
It is perhaps an indication of the significance of the National Question 
now in Scottish politics that all four/five of the parties seem to be in a weak 
position in one way or another, and that seems to suggest an unreality about 
the situation which seems unlikely to continue indefinitely. 
Summary 
The election of '87 created what might be called 'an unstable 
equilibrium', and there are basically three possible outcomes. First, that 
situation could be challenged by the opposition forces in Scotland, although 
that would not be easy and it would certainly involve tactics not formerly 
seen. Secondly, the Tories could alter policy on the National Question and 
introduce a scheme which was of considerable benefit to the Tory Party at 
UK level (ie, an Assembly scheme with reduced representation for 
Scotland- and hence Labour- at Westminster); however, this scenario 
looks pretty unlikely as long as (a) Mrs Thatcher remains Tory leader (since 
she has always hated the whole idea of devolution for Scotland), and/or (b) 
the Tories seem likely to win the next election fairly comfortably anyway. 
The third possibility is that very little happens, with the Tory 10-man team 
struggling along and 'brass-necking' their weak position and general 
unpopularity. 
However, if the question remains unresolved by the next General 
Election, then for the many reasons outlined earlier in this article, it is 
highly likely that the Tories will lose a further block of Scottish seats ( 4 of-
their seats have rna jorities of 2,000 or less) leaving them in a rely impossible 
position next time. Whichever of these scenarios comes to pass, the view 
that "Devolution is inevitable" (Brian Meek) does now seem to be the case, 
and it is also likely that any shift of political power to Scotland would now go 
far beyond the devolutionary ideas of the '70s and would be closer to some 
kind of 'quasi-federalism'. 
And although the 1987 election may not of itself have brought a major 
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shake-up of the constitutional arrangements within the United Kingdom, it 
will probably be seen in retrospect as a very significant milestone on that 
road, a point from which there is unlikely to be any turning back. 
Alan Lawson is editor of Radical Scotland magazine. 
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